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Mexican Drug Cartels and their Australian 
Connections: Tracking and Disrupting 
Dark Networks
Dr Anthea McCarthy-Jones, University of Canberra
Dr Daniel Baldino, University of Notre Dame, Fremantle
Abstract
For Australia, the emergence of Mexican drug cartels presents signifi cant policymaking, 
intelligence and strategic challenges. The size of these operations, their resource base 
and the fl uid nature of dark network structures makes these enterprise syndicates a 
highly versatile and resilient opponent. This paper will provide an analysis of the 
organisational levels of dark networks in dealing with Mexican drug cartels and 
explores how these profi t-seeking transnational actors form and operate including 
their motivations and modus operandi. It will also address the problematic nature 
of dark networks and the importance of robust intelligence collection and analysis 
capabilities to better prioritise border protection responses as well as to increase the 
ability of the security sector to target dispersed ‘webs’ of illicit affi liations, with a 
focus on the Asia-Pacifi c region. 
Keywords: Mexican drug cartels, transnational organised crime, intelligence-led 
policing, national security.
Introduction
Over the past few decades, the schemes of many organised crime groups have 
developed into sophisticated networks with common purpose that have increasingly 
taken on a highly adaptive dimension to their planning and co-ordination activities. 
Partly due to new developments in travel, technology and communications, they are 
no longer limited to local or traditional geographical locations in which to conduct 
illicit business activities.  Accordingly, the globalisation of crime has meant that nation 
states faced with identifying and confronting threats that are posed by transnational 
organised crime (TOC) must strengthen their ability to conduct and co-ordinate 
investigations and work with international partners to tackle joint problem areas such 
as reducing the global supply of (and demand for) illegal drugs. 
Yet identifying and fi ghting such linked threat actors and entrepreneurial criminal 
organisations creates many diffi cult challenges for Australian policy-makers and 
practitioners when deciding on the best course of multi-jurisdictional action. 
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A variety of practical considerations from cost effectiveness, to issues regarding 
sovereignty to criminal infi ltration of law enforcement, to the time-intensive nature 
of broad-based surveillance approaches (that do not necessarily produce instant 
results) all remain central concerns in steps towards the installation of best practice 
policy formulation. Additionally, a bulk of law enforcement in Australia continues 
to spotlight only single modes of traffi cking or drug product (Bright et. al., 2012).
In light of such considerations, we argue that social network analysis — in particular 
analysis of cross-border ‘dark networks’ — can help cover critical gaps in addressing 
the fl uid and convergent nature of TOC networks while offering some pathways 
for potential solutions to overcome these types of diversifi ed challenges that link 
suppliers with consumers. This will be demonstrated by fi rstly reviewing the literature 
on social network analysis, with particular attention paid to recent work on dark 
networks. The article will then present a case study of Mexican cartels in order to 
demonstrate the way in which these independent criminal organisations have evolved 
their operations into multifaceted network structures that utilise linkages with ad hoc 
criminal groups operating in the Asia-Pacifi c region. The case study highlights the 
way in which Mexican cartels have created and sustained a dark network of drug-
coordinated production and supply channels that are now capable of penetrating large 
markets, with Australia becoming an increasingly lucrative target.  Finally, this article 
considers the implications for Australia and its security sector. It outlines some ways 
in which network analysis can be used to inform current and future approaches to 
border protection that includes the role of enhanced intelligence to help combat dark 
networks, transit hubs and related implications.
Dark Networks
A wide variety of illegally operating organisations, including in drug traffi cking, people 
smuggling and money laundering, comprise profi t-driven dark networks. These elastic 
networks are characterised as being sets of ‘social entities linked directly or indirectly 
by various ties…characterized by a predominance of informal and communicative 
relations’ (Raab & Milward, 2003, p.417). Because dark networks operate in the 
shadows and function through the use of mobile and dispersed sub-groups, such 
a dynamic has make it diffi cult “…to develop any single, elegant theory of dark 
networks” (Wood, 2006, p.252). But in general terms, they exploit network forms 
of organisation, have buffers between people, are typifi ed by divisions of labour and 
retain fl uid arrangements between multiple groupings ‘where one unit is not merely 
the formal subordinate in some larger hierarchical arrangement’ (O’Toole, 1997, p45).
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Several distinctions can be made between open and trusting interconnected networks 
that are legal as opposed to the rise of dark networked enterprises. Covert dark network 
forms repeatedly operate on a ‘need-to-know basis’ symbolised by compartmentalised 
cells. As Raab (2003, p.420) has summarised, dark networks which operate in the 
global drug trade resemble ‘…a chain of bilateral contracts; a group or a person 
will only know his or her immediate predecessor or successor in the supply chain. 
Moreover, these distribution chains lack exclusivity; individuals at one level contract 
with individuals at of levels.’  This type of layered organisational structure makes 
them far more diffi cult to detect and eliminate as well as highly resilient through 
wide dispersions of resources and operations. These illegal enterprise syndicates have 
proven able to adapt to law enforcement pressures by quickly fi nding, for example, new 
approaches for managing their funds, selling drugs and expanding transhipment routes.
Dark networks do come in various forms and shapes. For example, in Jackson’s 
(2006) analysis of terrorist groups, a distinction is drawn between chain-networks 
(sequential links in a single line), spoke networks (links radiating from a single node), 
and all-channel networks in which units are coupled to all other units. This is similar 
to Grint’s (2005) use of network hierarchy wherein there is just enough structural 
coherence and coordination to maintain the network but there are no strictly defi ned 
limits on intermingled roles or incumbents. Grint (2005, p.156) also distinguishes 
between two network types when dealing with dark networks: the random type in 
which power and leadership are ‘evenly spread throughout an organisation’ and 
the scale-free model in which a few people have ‘enormous numbers of contacts’. 
Similarly, in dealing in comparable areas like remarketed prescription drugs, there are 
many so-called ‘gray’ networks – networks are not illegal per se but can nevertheless 
be troublesome because actors trade commodities through distribution channels that 
are unoffi cial or unintended by the original manufacturer.
Another way of understanding dark networks is to ask ‘how much strategic, operational 
and tactical infl uence specifi c components of the organisation have over others?’ 
(Jackson, 2006, p.245). Jackson (2006) underlines the need to distinguish between 
tightly coupled groups, coupled networks and loosely coupled movements. The tightly 
coupled group is like the classic hierarchical organisation, for example, the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army. The coupled network has greater plasticity in managing 
risks that leads to a greater autonomy of human agents (and replaceable lower-level 
players), although there still appears to be a ‘network core’ to provide direction. This 
core might include a pre-existing group with expertise and management knowhow 
and the ability to recruit or inspire new members. In the loosely coupled and vertically 
integrated movement, no individual or component group can make binding decisions 
for other actors in the network. 
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This might incorporate freelance elements such as the hiring of operators like 
neighbourhood gangs to protect and procure transportation corridors (Williams 
1998). Such a dynamic of coupled or loosely coupled networks with separated 
‘outsourced’ services best represent many of these alternative forms of modern 
criminal entrepreneurship.
The Rise of Mexican Cartels
Mexico remains at the centre of the global drug trade. Drug traffi cking organisations 
(DTOs) have operated in Mexico for over one hundred years. During the twentieth 
century, many of these groups established themselves as the key suppliers of 
marijuana and heroin. Throughout Mexico’s period of one-party rule (1929–2000) 
via the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), various criminal groupings acquired 
signifi cant wealth and power and were able to consolidate their illicit networks, safe 
havens and transit routes by spreading corruption within government circles and 
taking advantage of inadequate border security.
Due to an overall policy of accommodation by the federal government, offi cials 
guaranteed various degrees of impunity for certain DTOs in exchange for a limited 
regulation of illicit market and its profi t-making activities (Beittel, 2015, p.8). Such an 
informal agreement rested on a continuity of criminal production, protection and assets 
that had been fundamentally underwritten by the PRI during its period in government. 
However, by the end of the twentieth century, Mexico’s transition to democracy 
presented some opposition to this informal pact partially due to the subsequent infl ux 
of new political fi gures like former President Felipe Calderón. Calderón had based 
his campaign themes around policy issues like eliminating corruption and supported 
drug crop reduction as well as more aggressive approaches along the intervention 
and enforcement spectrum.
Calderón formally declared a ‘war against the cartels’ in 2006. Calderón’s military-
led crackdown saw the deployment of over 50,000 troops to various regions with 
a particular concentration in the territories that border the US. Unfortunately, the 
Mexican government severely underestimated the extent to which the cartels had 
amassed large arsenals to defend their territories and lucrative drug routes — and an 
accompanying willingness to use torture, assassination and brutal domestic terrorist 
tactics — as well as the large-scale and wide-spread infi ltration by the cartels into 
Mexican government institutions and law enforcement agencies to assist ongoing 
impunity. For example, the extent of brazen violence and corruption in Mexico was 
featured in the national and international coverage of the mass murder of 43 students 
that allegedly occurred due to the collusion and at the behest of a local mayor and 
his wife, the corrupt local police and a local criminal gang (Dudley & Gagne, 2014). 
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Over the past decade, every state in Mexico, with the exception of the Federal District 
(Mexico City) and parts of Oaxaca and Chiapas, has become a claimed territory by a 
cartel or in some cases, disputed territory by several DTOs (DEA, 2015). During this 
time, various cartels have fractured, different cartels have emerged (like the hyper-
violent La Familia Michoacana) and new coalitions have been formed in attempt to 
control a larger share of supply routes into the US and beyond. As Beittel (2015, p.5) 
highlighted ‘…the splintering of the large DTOs into competing factions and gangs 
of different sizes took place over several years. The development of these different 
crime groups, ranging in scope from transnational criminal organisations to small local 
mafi as with certain traffi cking or other crime specialties, has made the crime situation 
even more diffuse and their criminal behaviour harder to eradicate.’
Such developments in Mexico have taken place in the backdrop of a number of joint 
policy initiatives between the US and partners like Colombia aiming to target the 
cocaine industry operating in the Andean region. Ironically, the rise of the Mexican 
cartels and their increased power in the global illicit drug market can be explained due 
to some of the initial policy successes of the US and Colombian governments’ actions 
(e.g. Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative) to dismantle Colombian 
DTOs. These included the closure of traditional drug corridors, such as the Florida 
route, during the 1990s and early 2000s (Miami Herald, 24 June, 2004). But although 
these efforts had some success in destroying the monopoly previously enjoyed by 
Colombian cartels, they simultaneously created a power vacuum and an opportunity 
for the Mexican cartels to expand their profi ts and interests in the global illicit drugs 
trade.  This is known as the ‘balloon effect’ whereby pressure (via various resources) 
that is applied to a specifi c area to eradicate a problem, instead, results in the problem 
being relocated to another area - usually providing only a temporary inconvenience 
to criminal activities (Bagely, 2012, p.5). In fact, it can even be argued that Mexican 
drug cartels strongly benefi tted from the breakup of Colombian DTOs and have proven 
to be highly entrepreneurial and creative – such as sub-contracting the traffi cking of 
cocaine to displaced Colombian gangs.  
At the same time, the capturing or killing of drug leaders in Mexico itself has only 
served to create violent succession battles within the cartels themselves (Beittel, 
2015). Overall, the protracted confl ict between these many players has resulted in over 
250,000 people internally displaced in Mexico since 2006 while estimates of deaths 
resulting from the spiked violence of the war range between 60,000 and 120,000 
with a further 25,000 people considered to be desaparecidos (disappeared) (Beittel, 
2015). Some argue that the use and threat of such extreme violence is not only used 
by Mexican cartels to settle disputes and replace leaders but seen as desirable to 
encourage employee loyalty as well as a ‘semblance of order’ with suppliers, creditors, 
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and buyers through a culture of fear (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). Regardless, in the 
last few years, the key players to emerge from this setting that have displaced other 
Latin American DTOs include the renowned Sinaloa cartel (the most dominant group 
and increasingly tied to the drug trade in Australia) and its affi liates (also known as 
the Pacifi c Federation) and Los Zetas and the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación. 
Additionally, Mexican cartels are now largely poly-drug organisations, who traffi c 
items like cocaine, heroin, crystal methamphetamine and marijuana, and have begun 
to systematically expand their operations to other areas such as human smuggling 
and kidnapping. They have emerged the key players in the control the main drug 
transport routes into the US market as well as other foreign markets in Asia and 
Western and Eastern Europe. Interestingly, some critics have argued that a shift in 
American intelligence priorities since 9/11 has left signifi cant gaps in multisource 
intelligence related to the evolution of these major TOC networks (Burton and West, 
2009). For others, this poly-drug traffi cking has been a “deliberate modus operandi” 
to make these networks more evasive, multilayered and profi table (Hughes et. al., 
2016). And while Mexican cartels have a growing international presence, groups like 
Sinaloa continue to represent decentralized horizontal groupings characterised by 
independent cell-like cross border networks albeit with some sense of allegiance to 
a king-pin ‘entrepreneur’. As Beittel (2015, p.6) observed, ‘the larger organisations 
(Sinaloa, for example) that have adopted a cellular structure may still try to protect 
their leadership as in the recent orchestrated escape of the world’s most wanted drug 
kingpin, El Chapo Guzmán.’ 
Mexican Cartels in Australia
The rising appearance of Mexican cartels in Australia — and their transformation into 
illicit multinational conglomerates that aim to control transportation hubs — is the 
result of a combination of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. A key push factor incentivising 
cartels to seek out new markets has been the relative decline in demand for cocaine 
from the US. In the ruthless pursuit of profi t, this decline — possibly coupled with the 
legalization of marijuana in several states -— has meant that the US market alone can 
no longer sustain the rate of supply fl owing from the ‘south’ into the ‘north’ (UNODC, 
2015). Further, the weakening price of illicit drugs in the US market in comparison 
to European and Asia Pacifi c regions has acted as a further ‘push’ factor for cartels 
in seeking to franchise their profi t-maximising operations further afi eld.  
On the other hand, there are several ‘pull’ factors that have made Australia an attractive 
option in TOC expansion. According to the UNDOC (2015a. p.2), East Asia, South-
East Asia and Oceania have the largest number of Amphetamine-Type Stimulants 
(ATS) users in the world, totalling 9.5 million and a further 3.9 million ecstasy users. 
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Mexican cartels have drastically expanded their production and distribution of ATS 
in recent years, making the Asia Pacifi c a lucrative as well as logical region in which 
to extend their operations. Further, the appearance of Mexican DTOs in Australia 
coincided with a period in which the strength of the Australian dollar reached parity 
with the US dollar and at some points exceeded parity. The strength of the dollar and 
its ability to be easily converted into US currency has proved to be a strong “pull” 
factor for the cartels. 
Moreover, Australia commands some of the highest prices (wholesale and retail) for 
illicit drugs in the world. So, while there are greater transportation costs and other 
miscellaneous expenses associated with distribution to Asia Pacifi c markets, the 
revenue gained from accessing these markets far outweighs the initial outlays and costs 
on the part of the cartels.  For example, according to UNODC (2015b), the wholesale 
price per kilo of cocaine salts in the United States is approximately US$54,000 and in 
the UK the average price is US$87,000, however, in Australia, the price ranges between 
US$228,000 to US$259,000. In 2016, a spokesperson for the Australian Federal Police 
(AFP) even estimated the value to be as high as AU$350,000 (Banks, 2016). In this 
context, it is clear to see that in comparison to other major markets, the extremely 
high prices that can be obtained in Australia for wholesale products will continue to 
be a strong ‘pull’ factor for Mexican DTOs and other organised crime groups. 
Mexican cartels generally deal in the wholesale distribution of illegal narcotics, 
especially in relation to cost-effective activities in foreign markets. Their preference 
for primarily engaging the in wholesale rather than retail aspects of the illicit drug 
trade places these groups in a semi-dependent position when breaking into new 
markets. While the cartels have been able to takeover established smuggling routes 
into the Pacifi c (often previously set-up by Colombian cartels several decades earlier), 
there is a need on the part of the cartels to create and foster strong linkages with local 
criminal groups who resell the product through their own networks (ACC, 2015). The 
preference for the cartels to adopt this type of business practice is because they produce 
and traffi c such vast quantities of marijuana, heroin, cocaine and methamphetamines 
that there is enough profi t to be made from distributing wholesale without needing 
to branch into local distribution — which is riskier and prone to violent friction with 
competing criminal groups.  
Certainly, it does remain diffi cult to determine the total amount of illicit narcotics that 
are produced and traffi cked by Mexican cartels each year. However, recent reports 
do suggest that multiplying connections among criminal enterprises such as alliances 
between members of the Sinaloa cartel and groups such as Ofi cina de Evigado (criminal 
organisation in Medellin) and the Colombian FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
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Colombia) are a key to the Mexican cartels accessing up to 450 tons of Colombian 
cocaine from these two groups alone each year (El Universal, December 2015). 
As stated, these multi-nodal structures and the adaptive use of criminal facilitators 
with different working arrangements pose a number of challenges to Australia’s 
approach to combat TOC. For instance, in order for the cartels to ensure the continued 
receipt of wholesale shipments by local criminal groups, they often add ‘sweeteners’ 
to each business transaction. Some reports have suggested Mexican cartels provide 
local criminal groups with incentives such as illegal handguns and other arms in order 
to ‘sweeten’ their business dealings (Courier Mail, 2015). Such incentives create 
further potential domestic security problems for Australian law enforcement as local 
criminal groups are increasingly able to access new sources for the supply of illegal 
fi rearms. Complicating this issue is the fact that cartels such as the Sinaloa group do 
not favour a particular local criminal network in Australia. Instead, they appear to 
deal with any local criminal organisation that is in the position to regularly receive 
their large consignments. These include but are not limited to ‘Lebanese, Chinese and 
Albanian diaspora groups, and Australian outlaw biker gangs’ (NPR, 2012).  This is 
of particular concern because of the potential escalation of violence and ‘turf wars’ 
between local criminal groups vying for control of domestic distribution networks.   
Disrupting Dark Networks: Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Policy 
Options
For policy-makers and Australia’s law enforcement agencies, attempting to stem what 
seems to be a never-ending tide of illicit drugs into Australia can appear to be an 
exercise in frustration. However, there are a number of things that can be done to better 
address the problem of Mexican DTOs, their growing deception and this emerging 
threat to Australia’s national security. The one aspect that should be recognised fi rst 
and foremost is that this threat to Australia’s national security is not posed by one 
particular group or foreign organisation such as the Sinaloa cartel, rather, it is a threat 
posed by a dispersed and adaptive dark-network structure that spans the Asia-Pacifi c 
and includes multiple foreign and domestic actors.  
In broad terms, in combating DTOs and the operation of illicit markets, much recent 
work on disrupting illicit networks has focussed on two key approaches: kinetic and 
non-kinetic (Roberts and Everton, 2011). The kinetic approach entails ‘…offensive 
measures to eliminate or capture network members and their supporters and employs 
such things as bombs and bullets to pursue the campaign’ (Roberts & Everton, 
2011, p.3). Yet such military-led approaches by Mexico (sometimes in conjunction 
with support from impacted nations) — that have largely been fi xated on removing 
the leadership of the major DTOs — have had only a limited impact on the actual 
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fl ow of drugs. The Mexican government’s force-on-force strategies have also had a 
consistent track-record of being heavily criticized for misallocating resources and 
sharply increasing human rights violations by the military, which is largely untrained 
in domestic policing (see Beitel, 2015).
Alternately, Robert and Everton (2011, p.3) outline a variety of ways in which the 
non-kinetic approach ‘…employs neither bombs nor bullets but instead uses non-
coercive means to counter networks and impair a combatant’s will to fi ght.’ Non-kinetic 
approaches to the problem of criminality will encompass a variety of qualitative 
elements and related strategies that focus areas like supporting institutional judicial 
reform and community-based rehabilitation programs in Mexico itself. It can also entail 
increased intelligence gathering activities and the improved sharing of intelligence 
to support investigations and operational activities by impacted actors, including the 
enforcement of criminal fi nancial deterrence. 
In particular, intelligence collection and analysis capabilities can assist to ensure a 
measured, targeted response to prioritized issues while helping to ensure consequences 
of particular policy frameworks are fully recognised. For Australia, this will demand 
adopting a framework that utilizes a long-term ‘staged approach’ that prioritises 
intelligence gathering activities, including addressing defi cits in HUMINT operations, 
that aim to map out the reliance on sophisticated dark networks that operate across 
the Asia-Pacifi c region. Moreover, utilizing network analysis can allow openings 
to better identify critical regional nodes, the organisation and resources relied upon 
by these networks to function effectively and, critically, support decision-makers to 
develop longer term planning prescriptions rather than simply fi xate on immediate 
enforcement activities. 
Many illicit drugs are not directly smuggled from Mexico to Australia. For example, 
the majority of cocaine entering Australia is channelled through third countries in the 
Pacifi c, passing through hubs such as in New Caledonia, Tonga, Vanuatu and Fiji. 
‘In 2010-11, the majority of cocaine intercepted coming into Australia entered via 
small craft by way of the Pacifi c Islands…. or stowed away in commercial shipping 
containers (say, hidden in a shipment of ride-on lawn mowers or stone pavers)’ 
(Pottenger, 2013). Similarly, in 2013, this was evidenced by several large seizures 
including a capture via a luxury yacht that netted 750kg of cocaine bound for the 
Australian market (Raggat, 2013). Indeed, with increased US surveillance on the 
Mexican order alongside airports worldwide having tightened security settings, the 
US coast guard noted ‘that the rise in cocaine traffi cking in the Pacifi c corresponded 
with a 66 percent drop in cocaine traffi cking on land’ (Martel, 2015). So with the 
growth of the Pacifi c maritime corridor, it will remain crucial that policy-makers 
begin to focus on strategies that concentrate on the ‘borderless’ nature of crime, how 
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law enforcement agencies cooperate in an international context and best practice in 
areas like maritime interdiction and deterring the fi nancing of such cartel activates.  
According to UNODC 2015 World Drug Report, maritime seizures account for the 
largest quantities, averaging 365kg per seizure between 2009 and 2014 (UNODC, 
2015, p.39). In 2013, parcel post was the most commonly detected method of drug 
importation in Australia. However, in the same year, just three maritime seizure 
cases accounted for 74% of the total weight of heroin intercepted by Australian law 
enforcement agencies (The Guardian, 2013). UNODC (2015a, p.39–40) has correctly 
argued that maritime interdiction has potentially the greatest impact on total quantities 
of drug smuggled, traffi cking fl ows and availability of illicit drugs on a global level 
and therefore provides a clear opportunity for law enforcement agencies to produce 
positive outcomes in confronting the threat before it reaches Australian shores. 
In addition to cocaine, the synthetic drugs market has become more complex and 
interconnected with other regions. A 2015 UNODC report entitled ‘The Challenge of 
Synthetic Drugs in East and South-East Asia and Oceania’ (2015, p.4) identifi ed that 
the synthetic drugs market in East, South-East Asia and Oceania ‘is not a separate and 
self-contained entity, but part of a larger complex global network with interconnect 
channels for supply and demand’. The growing appetite for synthetic drugs has 
further encouraged Mexican cartels to increase their production, connection and 
distribution platforms across the Asia-Pacifi c. For instance, in 2012, Philippine law 
enforcement reported dismantling a sophisticated meth lab operated by a Chinese 
drug traffi cking group which was found to have clear connections to Mexican 
criminal networks (UNODC, 2015a, p.13). In 2013, Korean offi cials seized 15kgs 
of crystalline methamphetamine and identifi ed Mexico as the most likely point of 
origin of the drugs.  In the same year, Japanese offi cers uncovered the traffi cking of 
crystalline methamphetamine from Mexico directly into Japan (UNODC, 2015b, 
p.70). Similarly, in 2015 the Australian Crime Commission concluded that Mexican 
cartels are involved in methamphetamine in Australia and have been actively seeking 
out partnerships with local criminal networks in the region (ACC, 2015a).
More recently, reports have identifi ed the forging of close links between Chinese 
organised crime groups and Mexican cartels (Harris, 2014). These connections relate 
to the importation (by Mexican cartels from Chinese organised crimes groups) of 
precursors for the production of methamphetamines. The fi nished product is then 
shipped from Mexico (primarily Jalisco state) back to the Chinese mainland. Such 
structures illustrate the evolving organisational forms and symbiotic relationships 
within dark networks. And in another example, the announcement in early 2016 of a 
‘super seizure’ of ice that originated from Hong Kong with connections in mainland 
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China demonstrated the degree to which diverse organised crime groups have been 
able to develop and co-ordinate production and distribution methods (ABC, 2016).  
Other studies have pointed to these networks reverting to ‘low’ technical modes of 
communication that include targeting older people as unsuspecting couriers (Nixon, 
2016). Again, while these types of dispersed and agile organisational structures — 
from specialists to amateurs to opportunists — make it increasingly diffi cult for law 
enforcement agencies to easily identify high-value assets and targets in the network, 
they do reinforce the importance of strengthening transnational law enforcement 
cooperation, such as police-to-police information sharing and cooperation in 
investigations. 
Overall, it is apparent that, fi rst, in regard to skill and resource sharing, criminal groups 
have converged to form overarching networks that have removed previous reliance on 
unfettered access to a specifi c geographical location in which to conduct activities. In 
short, current practices are characterised by a wide variety of openings to adopt and 
exploit effective cell-type structures. Second, while many geographical limitations are 
removed, the nature of these networks mean that continued operations are contingent on 
‘collective cooperation’ and some degree of fi xed assets and transfer to achieve goals. 
Third, this places individuals, groups and the network as a whole in a perpetual state 
of semi-dependence. So even if parts of the network may not be entirely monitored, 
it is this perpetual state of semi-dependence that can be potentially used as leverage 
by law enforcement agencies when formulating policies (and transnational solutions) 
aimed at attacking ‘weakest-links’ within network settings — stemming from actors 
like cartel members to corrupt offi cials to fi nancial intermediaries.
In order for Mexican cartels to effectively penetrate markets in the Asia Pacifi c, they 
are forced to establish relationships with intermediaries and local actors in foreign 
markets to help guarantee the supply chain and distribution of their product. Such 
semi-dependence is amplifi ed due to the preference of Mexican cartels to primarily 
deal in the wholesale aspects of the illicit drug trade in foreign markets. For instance, 
in order for cartels to supply wholesale quantities of cocaine salts to the Australia 
market, they are forced to draw on the resources of a network that originates in rural 
Mexico, which then expands to include actors in the United States, East and Southeast 
Asia, the Pacifi c islands and ends with ties with local actors in Australia. This simple 
description reveals how this network performance is dependent on a vast array of 
linkages in multiple countries. These linkages are critical juncture points across the 
network because they are the key to keeping profi ts and the wider operational success 
of the network’s goals.  
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As a result of their operational importance, these critical junctures are potential 
weak points in the network that can be pro-actively exploited by law enforcement 
agencies. Further, unlike most countries, Australia is in a unique position to target 
these critical junctures and exploit the weaknesses of these facilitating networks due 
to its geographical location and systematic ties with many Asia-Pacifi c nations. This 
must include not only areas like maritime interdiction or enforcing criminal fi nancial 
deterrence but assembling closer relationships with partners such as America's 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as well as developing the customs and 
law enforcement capabilities of Pacifi c states that do not have the current capacity 
to patrol their territory and borders. Australia’s infl uence in the Asia-Pacifi c means 
that a focus on capacity-building with international partners and related areas like 
intelligence analysis and gathering can provide increased opportunities to map dark 
network structures and derive optimal planning and sustainable disruption strategies. 
Conclusion
Mexican drug cartels are well-organised global businesses. This TOC threat and allied 
supply chains has grown signifi cantly in density, diversity and complexity. Mexican-
driven networks continue to operate in a multidimensional manner worldwide, 
including utilising dark networks and emerging traffi cking routes throughout the 
Asia-Pacifi c. This internal dynamic through the use of forward and backward linkages, 
dispersed criminal facilitators in many countries and assorted smuggling routes and 
tactics means that DTOs are not a stand-alone or static movement. The fundamental 
point is that ‘…governments and law enforcement agencies have to think and act much 
more in network terms; they need to develop the same kind of fl exibility to operate 
both nationally and transnationally through the creation of informal transnational law 
enforcement networks based on trust that is exhibited by drug-traffi cking networks. 
Greater care also needs to be given to devising strategies for more effective attacks 
on networks’ (Williams, 1998, p.154). 
As such, the enhancing capacity to map and track transportation hubs, specialised 
cells and money laundering techniques will all be necessary fi rst steps that must be 
accompanied with improved sharing and collaboration with foreign counterparts about 
emerging Mexican drug cartels, their structure and the rise of illicit exchanges in the 
region. This will enable, in part, a better understanding of how these dark networks 
operate, the convergence of criminal activities at critical nodes and their unique 
transportation and distribution characteristics. It will also involve rethinking how 
intelligence collection and analysis capabilities can be best prioritized and implemented 
in order to support international efforts to identify such threat convergence and disrupt 
high-leverage intervention points within transnational organised crime chains.
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